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Each phase in the debate around development and the global economy is marked by a 
different theme: dependency in the 1960s and early 1970s, the new international 
economic order in the late 1970s, structural adjustment in the 1980s and, from the 1990s 
onwards, globalization. A new theme arises when an emerging trend is recognized (the 
information and communications revolution, for instance) or when the unexpected 
occurs—as with the 11 September  2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. 
The events of 11 September, together with the subsequent US response, have pushed 
‘conflict’ and ‘security’—terms which are subject to a plethora of meanings and 
interpretations—right to the front of the controversy surrounding globalization, adding 
new dimensions to already vigorous debates on the concept of ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor 
1999, Keen 1998) as well as the economic aspects of conflict more generally (Berdal 
and Malone 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 1998, Nafziger et al. 2000). In the 1990s, the 
intense social stresses generated by the unsteady transition from communism, the 
difficulties of economic reform in Africa and the Middle-East, and the Mexican and 
Asian Financial crises led many to link globalization—the theme of the 1990s—to the 
ferocious civil wars in Africa, the Balkans, and central Asia as well as to regional 
rebellions and secessions (Aceh, Chiapas, and East Timor). And globalization with its 
acceleration in flows of trade, finance, and people seemed to open up fresh 
opportunities for commercializing conflict, thereby internationalizing wars with national 
and local origins.  
The literature around New Wars has raised awareness of the relationship between global 
economic change and conflict. Yet much of the subsequent debate has become stuck in 
a rut, too-often invoking globalization, together with its cousins the ‘Washington 
Consensus’ and the ‘neo-liberal order’, as causes of conflict—as if asserting a link 
between these very broad (and often ill-defined) categories is proof enough.1 So to 
restart the debate in a meaningful way we need to unpack the broader issues, and look to 
the specifics of policies, actors, and countries. Hence, my focus is on only one of the 
many key issues, namely the interaction between countries emerging from civil war and 
the global economy. Does that interaction help or hinder their transition from war to 
peace? And in what ways could global economic policy be improved to facilitate their 
‘post-conflict’ recovery?  
This is a demanding and complex agenda which raises all kinds of issues—economic, 
political, and ethical. Moreover, it is complicated by the variety of forms that 
contemporary conflict takes, each conflict being to a degree distinct in its motives and 
circumstances. We should therefore be very wary about generalizations. Consequently, 
this paper mainly addresses the economic dimensions, concentrating on the importance 
of international trade to state-building (section 2) and the need for global public goods 
in a global market economy (section 3). And I mainly focus on the smaller countries 
emerging from civil war (particularly in Africa) rather than ‘international’ wars. For 
discussion of the Middle-East, as well as the consequences of the Iraq debacle, the 
reader must look elsewhere. Section 4 anticipates some of the reactions to my 
prescriptions, and concludes that the global economy does not work well for peace. 
                                                 
1   See Berdal (2003) and Newman (2004) for critiques of the concept of New Wars.   2
2  State-building and successful integration into the global economy 
It is well-known that revenue mobilization underpins the construction of developmental 
states, but the role of international trade in generating revenues, and thereby trade’s 
central role in state-building, have not received the recognition they deserve. Trade can 
be a powerful motor for economic growth, and growth creates a rising revenue base for 
states. The growth in incomes and market activity as well as imports and exports 
provide increasing amounts of income taxes, indirect taxes, and trade taxes (mostly 
import duties). These can be used to build core state functions and to expand the 
delivery of public services (Addison et al. 2004).2 Creating the necessary institutions—
tax administrations as well as customs and excise services—is therefore a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for revenues to grow: economic growth is crucial. How societies 
integrate themselves into the global economy, and whether that integration is growth-
promoting, are therefore critical to the chances of successful state-building (and indeed 
to their chances of democratization since democracy tends to follow prosperity). Of 
course, the state may be built for many different purposes, including dictatorship or for 
making wars on other states, so that state-building does not automatically give rise to 
peace. Still, without state-building the chances for a more hopeful trajectory post-
conflict will come to nothing: an effective state is essential to broad-based (poverty 
reducing) recovery and growth (Addison 2003a).  
It is true that domestic-demand growth can drive economic growth in large-population 
countries, even if per capita income is initially low (for example, Brazil, China, and 
India). But export-demand is the main driver of growth in small countries, at least until 
their per capita income rises to middle-income levels, thereby creating a larger domestic 
market and greater possibilities for import-substitution.3 And civil wars of the type that 
concern us here have nearly all occurred in small low-income countries. Moreover, 
contemporary conflicts typically reduce per capita income and domestic purchasing 
power; exports will remain important for growth in the early years of post-conflict 
recovery until household income recovers—thereby generating new opportunities for 
producers serving domestic markets (including community-based livelihood projects).4  
Conflict countries have many points of contact to the global economy including: flows 
of illegally-produced and internationally traded minerals and narcotics; flows of finance 
involved in the looting of national assets and the subsequent transmission of the money 
offshore; flows of information as new communications technologies are used to 
organize war economies and international terrorism; and flows of people as fighters, 
refugees, and ‘human commodities’ (including the trafficking of women and children). 
                                                 
2  For contrasting views on state-building in post-conflict societies, see Chesterman (2004), Fukuyama 
(2004) and Rotberg (2004). 
3  Whether, and at what stage of their development, countries should use import-protection (by means of 
tariffs, quotas, or government subsidies) is not an issue I address here, except to note that using tariffs 
and quotas effectively to achieve structural economic change very much depends upon state 
capacities—which are in short supply in contemporary post-conflict economies—while lack of 
revenues precludes large government subsidies in most post-conflict economies.  
4  One of the other sources of growth in the immediate post-war years is the activities of donors and 
NGOs. If the export-sector is very damaged by war then aid-donor activity can be one of the few 
dynamic elements of the post-war economy and while aid is crucial to post-conflict recovery it can 
have some distorting effects (for instance absorbing scarce skills at the cost of domestic private 
investment as well as state institution-building).  
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The issue therefore is not one of reconnecting economies that are disconnected from the 
global economy; rather it is changing the nature of their interaction in ways that secure 
both war-to-peace transition and broad-based recovery and growth.  
Meeting this over-arching goal, however, faces at least three major difficulties. First, a 
narrow range of primary commodities dominate the exports of conflict countries, 
making economic management especially difficult, and recovery can easily be derailed. 
Second, the exports of conflict countries include ‘conflict commodities’ such as ‘blood 
diamonds’, illegally-cut timber, and hard drugs, and these can provide warlords with 
more resources than the state itself—so that trade may be warlord-building rather than 
state-building. Third, rich-country protectionism impedes trade-led agricultural growth 
in poor countries, including the conflict-affected, and agriculture is a vital sector for 
post-conflict recovery and for the creation of peaceful livelihoods in general. If these 
obstacles are not overcome then post-conflict reconstruction will be, at best, an exercise 
in rebuilding economies and societies as they were before war, often resurrecting and 
exacerbating deep inequalities, and leaving countries weaker in their ability to achieve 
broad-based development. I now take each of the three difficulties in turn. 
2.1  Commodity dependence and the weak link to development 
Low-income conflict countries are overwhelmingly dependent on commodity exports. 
Consequently their economic management faces all the problems inherent in commodity 
dependence, including the volatility of world prices that often generates a boom-bust 
cycle for producers (UNCTAD 2004). Producers of energy, minerals, and some soft 
commodities are presently benefiting from stronger growth in China and India as well 
as Japan’s economic recovery, all of which have driven up prices after years of 
stagnation. Oil economies, which have a high incidence of conflict, are benefiting from 
an oil price which is at a 13-year peak.5 Will they use this windfall for development or 
will it be squandered? Take, for example, the African oil producers, politically a very 
fragile group. Angola and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) went through 
civil wars (lasting over 25 years in Angola’s case), while Chad, Equatorial Guinea and 
Sao Tome and Principe have histories of political instability. And the distribution of 
Sudan’s oil revenues is a key item in the peace agreement between Khartoum and the 
southern secessionists.  
Mismanagement and theft of oil and gas revenues are common. In Angola, US$4.3 
billion of oil revenues went missing between 1997 and 2002, and nearly one-third of 
government spending occurs outside the official budgetary framework (Shaxson and 
White 2004). Given the depth of Angola’s poverty, these resources are a major loss to 
post-war recovery (Adauta de Sousa et al. 2003). Some of the blame can be laid at the 
door of national elites, but bribery has been all too common as well. Companies acting 
as agents pay the bribes, thereby enabling oil companies to deny any involvement. 
Financial globalization facilitates such secret payments, but recent legislation to combat 
money laundering by organized crime and terrorists has scooped up suspicious transfers 
by agents with connections to some major oil companies. The French and US authorities 
                                                 
5  Although oil economies are more vulnerable to conflict, its character and severity show considerable 
variation: localized violence in Nigeria’s Delta region, the attempted secessions of Indonesia’s oil-rich 
provinces, increasing domestic terrorism in Saudi Arabia, short and long civil wars in Africa 
(Republic of Congo and Angola, respectively) and inter-state war followed by civil war in Iraq.   4
are presently investigating allegations that companies paid up to US$180 million to win 
contracts in Nigeria’s natural gas industry (McNulty 2004). The current oil boom may 
therefore have little benefit for the majority of people in the producing countries—a 
depressing but all too realistic prospect (Gary and Karl 2003; Global Witness 2004a).  
What can be done? Transparency in resource use is crucial. The Republic of Congo has 
now agreed to publish previously secret revenue data, a condition of further IMF 
assistance to the country. And one promising step forward is the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) which aims to increase revenue accountability through 
full corporate and government disclosure. EITI will help civil societies challenge 
governments to spend these revenues on development. But the resources of local 
campaigning groups are generally modest and they, together with any independent 
media that may exist, are often harassed—sometimes at the cost of their lives. Hence, 
EITI and other such initiatives must be supported by determined action on corruption’s 
supply-side; in particular, rich countries should prosecute overseas bribery more 
vigorously. The United States was almost the only country with such legislation—and 
overseas bribes were tax-deductible in France and Germany—before the agreement by 
OECD countries to impose criminal penalties on nationals guilty of bribery took effect 
in 1999. However, deterrence depends on prosecutions and not a single case has yet 
been heard in a UK court. Europe’s financial authorities have dallied for years in 
tracking down the US$3 billion stolen by the late General Sani Abacha from Nigeria’s 
treasury. And in the US, the country with the oldest legislation, only 39 criminal 
prosecutions have been brought in 27 years.  
Overall, mineral-dependent countries would be well-advised to use the present windfall 
to diversify their economies, a task that remains critical for commodity-dependent 
economies as a whole. But to achieve this effectively, countries need to take back 
control of the resources and revenues that are being lost in the illegal mining and 
production of conflict commodities. These can then be used to finance economic 
diversification, especially in ways that benefit the poor. It is to this task that we now 
turn.  
2.2  The resilience of conflict commodities 
Conflict commodities are now a focus of international action; gem stones, timber and 
drugs have all funded war (Collier 2003; Malone and Nitzschke 2004). The associated 
financial flows are also a promising opportunity for action; disrupting UNITA’s 
finances reduced the movement’s effectiveness towards the end of Angola’s civil war, 
for example. Attention has now shifted to the role of gem stones, particularly diamonds, 
in financing international terrorism. During Sierra Leone’s civil war, diamond buyers 
for al-Qaeda are alleged to have colluded with Liberia’s then government, and they are 
said to remain active in West Africa. The Chief Prosecutor for the UN Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, David Crane, recently stated:  
We have in the process of investigating Charles Taylor ... clearly uncovered that 
he harboured al-Qaeda operatives in Monrovia as late as the summer of 2001 … 
the central thread is blood diamonds’ (Global Witness 2004b).  
The main international initiative to deal with the problem of blood diamonds is the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) which has been in operation since  
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1 January 2003, with a membership of 50 diamond producing, trading and polishing 
countries. Participating countries agree to import and export diamonds which have the 
KPCS certificate. In effect the KPCS aims to create a two-tier market in which 
illegitimate diamonds sell at a discount relative to legitimate (certified) diamonds, 
thereby cutting the value of conflict diamonds to sellers (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  
There remain, however, significant problems at the production end of the diamond 
chain. Up to half of Sierra Leone’s gem stones are still smuggled out of the country 
(Diamonds and Human Security Project 2004: 9). The Republic of Congo became a test 
case for the KPCS in early 2004. The Republic of Congo produces only 55,000 carats 
but exports 5.2 million carats a year (worth more than US$200 million) much of which 
consists of re-exports of diamonds smuggled in from Angola and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) (Innocenti 2004). These figures became public in the annual 
report which each member of the KPCS must now submit, confirming what many had 
suspected for years (Dietrich 2002). In late 2004 the Republic of Congo was expelled 
from the Kimberley Process and is now campaigning for reinstatement.  
The consumer end of the commodities chain also has serious problems. A recent report 
by Global Witness finds only weak compliance among major jewellery retailers and 
concludes that: ‘The self-regulation, which is supposed to cover the entire diamond-
jewellery supply chain, from the mine to point of sale to the consumer, is amounting to 
not much more than a public relations manoeuvre with little credibility behind it’ 
(Global Witness 2004c). And although the Clinton administration strongly supported the 
Kimberley process, the ‘Bush administration has been largely indifferent to it, having 
been slow to sign up to its monitoring provisions’ (Lyman and Morrison 2004: 84). In 
summary, the KPCS has added some teeth to international concern, but the fundamental 
problem remains that a great deal of Africa’s gem stone economy is not in legitimate 
hands. This is an aspect of global justice—the application of the rule of law—that we 
discuss in the next section.  
The global market in drugs also fuels conflict, notably in Afghanistan (which produces 
75 per cent of the world’s supply of opium) and Colombia (the major producer of 
cocaine). Indeed, Afghanistan under the care of the international community now 
produces and exports more opium than it did under the Taliban regime (which in its last 
years banned all drugs and savagely punished offenders). The IMF values the opium 
trade at US$2.6 billion a year (equivalent to 60 per cent of the country’s GDP). Opium 
together with the revenues generated by the traditional activity of smuggling provides 
the country’s warlords with revenues to match those of the government (for comparison, 
the 2003-2004 development budget is US$1.7 billion). Afghanistan’s warlords are 
accumulating resources on a scale that makes it relatively easy for them to bend post-
conflict recovery to their own purposes, both politically and economically (Gannon 
2004).  
Clearly, the global economy in drugs is functioning very well. What can be done? One 
useful proposal is that of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who argue for the creation of a 
two-tier market in drugs (with registered addicts in rich countries able to obtain legal 
government supplies, thereby driving down the price in the illegal market). The world 
price of hard drugs would then fall, reducing financial flows to producers. Providing 
livelihoods that offer an alternative to growing opium and other drug-producing plants 
is also crucial; ultimately broad-based development is essential to undermining the grip   6
of narcotics on poor countries. However, rich-country protectionism in agriculture 
hinders such development, and it is to this that we now turn.  
2.3  The security implications of rich-country protectionism 
Agriculture is a livelihood for the world’s poor, a source of economic growth, and a 
major foreign-exchange earner. Agriculture is the economic mainstay of post-conflict 
countries like Mozambique, especially for their poor. Indeed, given the difficulties in 
using mineral revenues for development, agriculture is often the best prospect for pro-
poor recovery in resource-rich countries like Angola as well. Land reform, micro-
finance, and pro-poor investments in infrastructure and research can raise the benefits of 
agricultural growth for poor people, but it is also vital for the world market in 
agriculture to function well. That market, however, is grossly distorted by the policies of 
the rich countries, largely to the disadvantage of the poor world. Rich-country subsidies 
depress farm incomes across the developing world, including post-conflict countries 
where rural poverty is exceptionally high. 
Afghanistan illustrates this point. There are few alternative crops to opium in 
Afghanistan, but one is cotton, which was produced in significant amounts in the 1970s. 
But by 2003, war had cut output to 8 per cent of its 1983 level (Nells and Usman 2003). 
Substantial private and public investment is needed to restart production in cotton and 
other agricultural livelihoods but rich-country protectionism reduces the return to 
investment. The EU spends €900 million (US$1.07 billion) annually on subsidizing its 
domestic cotton farmers, while 25,000 American cotton farmers enjoy an annual 
subsidy of US$3.7 billion (Gillson et al. 2004). The US is the largest cotton-exporting 
nation (accounting for 40 per cent of world trade) and US and EU subsidies depress 
world prices; cotton prices would have been 12.6 per cent higher between 1999 and 
2002 without the US subsidy (Alden 2004). 
The EU and US sugar subsidies are similarly harmful. Every Euro of sugar that Europe 
exports carries a subsidy of €3.30 at a total cost of €1.5 billion (Oxfam 2004). The 
lower world price has cost three African producers US$238 million since 2001—
Ethiopia and Mozambique (both post-conflict countries) and Malawi (at peace but very 
poor) (Oxfam 2004). Although some countries, notably Swaziland and Mauritius, gain 
from the EU’s present sugar policy (which provides them with preferential access to the 
protected EU market), the developing world as a whole loses, particularly the larger and 
more efficient producers. 
If reducing rich-country protectionism does raise economic growth in the developing 
world—as policy simulations suggest (Anderson 2004)—then the incidence of civil war 
may fall, since cross-country empirical work finds that growth tends to reduce the risk 
of conflict occurring (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Quite why this should be so is a 
matter of continuing debate and many would argue that other socio-economic factors, in 
particular inequality (and specifically inequality across social groups), can be as 
important or indeed more important (see Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Stewart 2001). 
Still we can construct a number of plausible scenarios whereby trade-led growth could 
contribute to peace (and be supportive of political processes to make peace). 
Eliminating rich-country cotton subsidies would, for example, raise growth in Africa’s 
Sahel (where cotton is one of the region’s few comparative advantages) thereby  
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reducing the frustrations of the young unemployed and the attractions of militant Islam. 
And it would reduce migration from the Sahel to West Africa’s coastal states where 
local demagogues have played on resentment against immigrants, notably in the lead up 
to Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war.   
In summary, phasing out agricultural protectionism by rich countries could help the 
development and security of poor nations. This is not to imply that reforming the world 
cotton market offers some instant solution for reviving Afghanistan’s economy or 
weaning its farmers away from opium, but rich-country cotton subsidies certainly do 
nothing to help Afghanistan or other poor nations. Nor should we assume that further 
liberalization of world agriculture is without costs for the developing world, particularly 
the food-importing nations which will face higher world food prices if rich-countries cut 
their subsidies to food-producers (Laird et al. 2004). Whereas this will be to the benefit 
of surplus-producing farmers in developing countries, an increase in the consumer cost 
of food can cause real hardship for the poor and set off political discontent. The 
standard advice is to liberalize and simultaneously put in place social protection to 
offset the poverty-impact of higher food prices. But the track record in creating safety 
nets for the poor is very varied across countries, with the poorest countries generally 
experiencing the most difficulty.6  
Although there is a strong case for viewing rich-country protectionism through a 
security lens, rich-country governments are reluctant to take such a view, and a narrow 
‘business as usual’ interpretation of their domestic and commercial interests seems set 
to prevail. Thus in the case of EU cotton, producer subsidies are seen as an income-
transfer mechanism (albeit a very inefficient one) to the lower-income regions of 
southern Europe—producer prices in Greece and Spain are between 144 and 184 per 
cent higher than the world price (Baffes 2003)—and this, rather than the impact on 
West Africa and other poor regions, is likely to govern EU policy. EU sugar-refining 
companies are also a strong lobby in Brussels for the continuation of domestic subsidies 
that benefit their industry. Similarly, there is no sign yet that US policymakers have 
reflected at all on the wider security impact of agricultural subsidies, and agribusiness 
remains highly influential; large growers receive three-quarters of the cotton subsidy 
and they are active lobbyists in Washington DC, for example. However, the larger 
developing countries, notably Brazil, are beginning to flex their muscles. In April 2004 
the WTO made a preliminary ruling that the US cotton subsidy was excessive, boosted 
US exports and depressed prices at the expense of Brazil and other producers, and 
therefore breached US obligations to the WTO. In June 2004, a WTO dispute panel 
upheld the preliminary ruling, which the US is now appealing against. A spokeswoman 
for the US trade representative responded with a statement that: ‘we have no intention 
of unilaterally disarming’—an unfortunate turn of phrase given the link between trade 
and security that this paper emphasizes.7 
 
 
                                                 
6  A somewhat different set of issues is raised by liberalization in manufacturing and services (see Guha-
Khasnobis 2004).  
7  The quotation by the US trade representative is contained in Colitt and Alden (2004).   8
3  Global markets and global public goods 
Just as a national economy cannot operate effectively without the provision of public 
goods, so the global market economy cannot be efficient (or fair) without global public 
goods (see Kaul et al. 2003).8 The under-provision of public goods occurs at the global 
level for much the same reasons that it occurs within nations for, as Adam Smith noted 
in 1776, such goods 
though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society are, 
however, of such a nature that the profits could never repay the expenses to any 
individual or small number of individuals … (Smith 1994 [1776]: 779).  
Global public action is therefore necessary to fill the gap left by private action, just as 
national governments must fill the gaps left by national markets. And the benefits of 
providing public goods obviously go beyond the purely economic—security, a healthier 
life, and environmental protection are important goals in their own right. 
Global justice is one of the many global public goods that are chronically underprovided 
(‘global justice’ is used here as a shorthand term to cover law and order pertaining to the 
person, property, and contract i.e. the instruments of justice). Progress has certainly 
been made, notably through the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). And 
national judiciaries now co-operate more closely with international and regional courts; 
Slaughter (2004) detects in these networks the start of the globalization of justice. But 
there is a long way to go; the US has not ratified the ICC—and this is unlikely under the 
Bush administration—and the enforcement of international legal rulings is patchy at 
best, particularly those of the international war-crimes tribunals.  
Greater provision of global justice, together with related public goods such as peace-
keeping, would have large economic benefits aside from averting immense human 
suffering. The cost of a civil war in a typical developing country is at least US$64.2 
billion, including the value of the lost output as well as the value of the lost life and 
health (Collier and Hoeffler 2004: 135). This exceeds the total amount of official 
development assistance (ODA) provided annually to all developing countries (about 
US$52 billion), a significant part of which is now committed to post-conflict 
reconstruction. Second, the new institutional economics tells us that economic activity 
is inhibited by high transactions costs when the protection of the person and property is 
weak (North 1997). Private investment falls, and is distorted away from productive (and 
employment-generating) activities towards activity which affords a quick exit (trading 
in scarce goods, for example). These effects can persist for years when the end of the 
war is uncertain (presently the case in Liberia, with Charles Taylor still at liberty). 
Third, we have already referred in the previous section to the waste of resources in 
conflict-affected countries arising from corruption in the natural resource sector, 
particularly oil and gas, and the weakness of international law and enforcement in this 
area. Voluntary action through corporate social responsibility (CPR) under the scrutiny 
of civil society has been much emphasized of late. But CPR cannot substitute for a 
                                                 
8  Public goods are desirable goods and services which the market provides in too small a quantity or 
which are not provided at all. Global public goods include: peacekeeping; the prevention of 
contagious diseases; research into tropical medicines, vaccines, and agricultural crops; the prevention 
of chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the limitation of carbon emissions, and the preservation of 
biodiversity (Kaul et al. 2003).  
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properly functioning global legal framework to regulate the international corporate 
sector, especially in conflict areas. 
Our discussion has emphasized global justice as a crucial public good. But there are two 
other vital global public goods that we should note—albeit only too briefly—before 
moving on. First, global environmental protection remains chronically under-funded. 
Global climate change can destabilize societies and not just in the developing world: a 
recent study for the US Department of Defense concludes that global warming, if not 
halted, will be a significant catalyst for future civil wars and inter-state wars (Schwartz 
and Randall 2003). Second, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases 
(such as tuberculosis) are causal factors in conflict; the decline in populations of 
working age (the group with the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS) undermines 
economies and the effectiveness of state institutions (Cincotta et al. 2003). Economic 
decline and weak institutions in turn increase the probability of conflict. This effect 
becomes cumulative since a weakening in overall state capacity is often associated with 
deterioration in the quality of public health institutions (Price-Smith 2002).9 And 
violent conflict itself spreads HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases (World Bank 
2003). Thus Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone have emerged from war with very high 
levels of HIV/AIDS; this strains their meagre health budgets even further and endangers 
the crucial task of reconstructing and reforming their state institutions. 
3.1  Where will the resources be found to fund global public goods? 
We have already suggested that the provision of global public goods will be resource-
saving  by reducing the lost investment and output associated with war, as well as 
resource-generating by enhancing the efficiency of production and market-exchange. 
This applies not only to the conflict-countries themselves but to all countries, both rich 
and poor, whose economies (and budgets) increasingly bear the costs of conflict (for 
example, consider the resources now devoted to securing the global airline and shipping 
industries). In principle these benefits provide incentives for nations to make 
agreements to introduce international taxes to finance global public goods.10 However, 
this argument assumes that: (i) countries recognize the benefits (ii) they are persuaded 
of the practicality of the taxes and the effectiveness of the resulting public goods and 
(iii) they do not instead adopt a strategy of free-riding on the efforts of others. These are 
all formidable problems. 
What form could these international taxes take? This question is bound up with the 
larger issue of development finance—a debate reinvigorated by the 2002 UN Financing 
for Development Summit in Monterrey—and the even larger question of the UN’s role 
in international economic governance (Nayyar 2002). An analysis prepared for the UN 
General Assembly (Atkinson 2004) discusses the relative merits of global 
environmental taxes (a carbon-use tax), a tax on currency flows (the ‘Tobin tax’), and 
the principles of international taxation more generally. This study finds that quite 
modest rates of taxation will raise significant funds. Moreover, the carbon-use tax has a 
                                                 
9  High infant mortality is a good predictor of state failure in cross-country empirical studies (King and 
Zeng 2001: 650).  
10 In effect, once the supply of global public goods increases, the international community is taxing a 
portion of the resulting output to fund the on-going costs of public-goods provision.    10
‘double dividend’, not only reducing harmful climate change but also raising resources 
for further development spending. The ‘Action Against Hunger and Poverty Initiative’ 
of the Governments of Brazil, Chile, France and Spain also proposes international taxes 
together with voluntary measures by individuals and businesses to mobilize 
development finance (also discussed in the Atkinson 2004 study). However, the present 
US administration is firmly opposed to any form of international taxation as well as to 
any role for the UN in this area, while cautiously supporting some voluntary measures 
(such as private and corporate philanthropy).  
Despite the present impasse on financing measures that require international collective 
agreement, considerable scope remains for individual nations or groups of nations to 
increase aid flows. Whilst the economies of the rich world have more than doubled in 
size over the past 30 years, they are presently spending a smaller proportion of their 
GNP on aid than at any time since the 1960s. Most of the aid-to-GNP ratios of the 
bilateral donors are below the UN’s target of 0.7 per cent; the average has fallen from 
0.33 per cent of GNP in the mid-1980s to 0.23 per cent in 2002 (OECD-DAC 2004). 
After years of stagnation some progress is now being made; the UK proposal for an 
International Finance Facility (IFF) seeks to raise aid by ‘front-loading’ the increase and 
is supported by France and a number of G-20 group members (Mavrotas 2004). Given 
US equivocation over aid (its aid-to-GNP ratio is only 0.14 per cent) together with its 
reluctance to support multilateralism, many hope that the EU might exercise leadership 
on development finance and, more broadly, international economic governance.   
Atkinson (2002) proposes that the EU commit 1 per cent of its GNP to development 
assistance; that is 1 per cent of €10,000 billion—the resulting €100 billion would add 
substantially to the total level of aid (US$52 billion) presently provided by OECD-DAC 
members. However, the EU’s over-restrictive fiscal rules (the ‘Stability and Growth 
pact’) reduces the chances of such a bold step in the near future. 
Debt relief also has conflict and security dimensions. Conflict countries have 
accumulated substantial foreign debts as a result of past aid loans, together with 
international commercial borrowing (mostly by the oil economies which used oil as 
collateral). Of the 41 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) 11 are classified by the 
IMF and the World Bank as conflict-affected, and owe some US$63 billion, a large 
proportion of it to the donors themselves (IMF and World Bank 2001: 21). Much of this 
debt is odious; accumulated by past dictatorships with little concern for the impact of 
the debt-servicing burden on the general population (Addison and Rahman 2004). In the 
case of Zaire (now the DRC) the United States, France and Belgium pressured the IMF 
and the World Bank to continue lending after it was apparent to all impartial observers 
that Mobutu was incapable of using the money for development purposes (Wrong 
2000). Although the HIPC Initiative is a step in the right direction, it has pursued a slow 
and cumbersome process and one which is, in the case of the conflict countries, largely 
disconnected from efforts by the African Union and UN to achieve workable and lasting 
peace agreements (Addison and Murshed 2003). 
Will the additional resources from debt relief and increased aid be effectively used? The 
effectiveness of aid for developing countries as a whole has generated considerable 
debate, especially in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see 
UNDP 2005, and  McGillivray 2003 for an overview). There is now an equally lively 
debate on aid effectiveness in post-conflict countries: Addison (2004b) argues that aid 
has potentially strong benefits, Intriligator (2004) is very sceptical, while Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) adopt a middle position between the two. What accounts for this range  
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of views? Critics of aid tend to look back to the era of the cold war when aid allocations 
across countries were significantly influenced by the strategic objectives of the major 
donor countries, with development being secondary in many cases. Unfortunately these 
strategic objectives amounted to keeping in power such dictators as Mobutu of Zaire 
and Said Barre of Somalia, at great cost to their countries. But this does not undermine 
the argument for well-designed aid; it only warns us what happens when aid policy 
becomes subsumed to the larger strategic goals of the donor country. 
Still, the absorption problem remains and must be taken seriously. The ability of 
countries to absorb increased external resources can only be fundamentally improved as 
the capacities of recipient states improve, and as democratic governance is built 
(transparency in revenue and spending allocations with parliamentary oversight, being 
the most critical dimensions). This in turn requires growth in domestic revenues which, 
as we argued earlier, in large part depends on achieving trade-led growth—and 
therefore on reducing obstacles such as rich-country protectionism. Hence aid 
effectiveness, and therefore the decision on what should be its appropriate volume for 
each recipient, cannot be separated from the larger issues of how poor countries interact 
with the global economy. 
4 Conclusions 
Some readers may well feel that the analysis and prescriptions offered in this paper do 
not go far enough, and that some more thorough overhaul of global capitalism is 
required—perhaps involving less engagement by developing countries with the global 
economy. Certainly, I have put forward what is largely a technocratic agenda, seeking to 
advance reform of the global economy as it now stands, and have argued the case for 
more global integration not less. But the paper also makes the argument for changing 
the nature of the way in which poor countries, particularly those in transition from 
conflict, interact with the global economy; with an emphasis on directing export-
revenues in resource-rich countries to development tasks, tackling corruption’s ‘supply-
side’, and reducing rich-country protectionism in agriculture. And the paper emphasizes 
the importance of providing global public goods to fill the serious gaps left by global 
markets, and the urgent need to mobilize finance for their provision as well as for 
development assistance more generally. Achievements in these areas would take us 
considerably further than we are at present—and in that sense the prescriptions in this 
paper offer a radical (albeit liberal) agenda for change.  
One of the principal arguments of this paper is that economic growth is necessary for 
state-building—since growth delivers a rising revenue-base—and that trade, for small 
countries where most of the last decade’s civil wars have taken place, provides an 
important source of growth if carefully managed. This is of course a very broad 
statement. Historically, countries with effective trade-led growth strategies show 
considerable variation in the blend of state and market used. Outward-orientated 
development strategies can consist of low protection of the domestic market (to 
encourage exporting), direct subsidies to exporters, or import-protection combined with 
implicit export subsidies—profits from domestic sales being then reinvested in an 
export-drive (as South Korea did during its phase of fast industrialization, following 
reconstruction from the 1950-53 Korean war). Today WTO membership and rules 
imply considerably less scope for using import protection and subsidies as part of a   12
development strategy. Irrespective of this, translating lessons from East Asia’s success 
stories into contemporary development strategies needs considerable care, not least 
when it comes to small countries with weak states.  
Moreover, it is a broad statement to say that peace can be promoted by more economic 
growth in the developing world. Indeed, some may say it is a leap of faith. Certainly, I 
do not wish to deny the importance of good politics to steer grievances into peaceful 
channels for their expression and resolution. But reducing grievances depends on having 
a state that is effective enough to deliver on the political promises: better public services 
and infrastructure to reduce regional and ethnic income inequality, for example. And 
that depends on achieving revenue-growth which in turn requires economic growth to 
deliver a rising tax base. For sure, the whole structure of revenue collection and public 
expenditures usually requires comprehensive overhaul but again the effectiveness of 
that system to run the public finances is inherently part of state-building—and therefore 
the system itself needs revenues for its construction. Nor must growth be bought at any 
price: environmental destruction undermines livelihoods and therefore growth itself, and 
can be a major source of social conflict in its own right. 
Finally, although broad-based (poverty reducing) recovery needs an effective state, 
state-building does not in itself create peace—either domestically or with neighbours. 
Thus countries with stronger states than those in Africa have experienced civil war or 
have regions attempting secession (Sri Lanka, and Kashmir in India, for example). 
Eritrea and Ethiopia built more effective development states over the 1990s and then 
went to war with each other in 1998-2000 and while the states of Rwanda and Uganda 
are now more developmental than in the past, their relations remain tense, not least over 
the DRC. Reflecting on European history, Tilly (1985) reminds us that ‘war makes the 
state, and the state makes wars’. It would indeed be a paradox if state-building in poor 
countries became associated with greater inter-state conflict, and less civil war. For this 
reason at least, the world needs better frameworks and institutions to contain wars 
between states.   
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